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A SUN TZU APPROACH TO COUNTER AL-QAEDA'S GLOBAL INSURGENCY
Despite the multiple coordinated attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda (AQ) in the United States and at strategic locations abroad, there remain some leaders in government who are incapable of accurately assessing the strategic nature of this terrorist organization. As a nation we have devoted a tremendous amount of our country's strategic resources to analyzing AQ tactical operations. We have not however, rigorously examined AQ using established theoretical frameworks on war.
This paper will attempt to examine AQ's operations through the tenets of Sun Tzu's theory of war, known as The Art of War. The primary purpose is to give the reader a better understanding of the relevant strategic operational methods employed by AQ, by briefly analyzing its past methods and operations against Sun Tzu's conceptual framework. The essay concludes with some initial recommendations on how the U.S.
can restructure our current civilian-military doctrine using an "Art of War" analytical framework to gradually curtail AQ operations.
The U.S. and our allies have expended much blood and treasure in an effort to destroy and disrupt the global jihadist backbone of AQ throughout the world, with limited success. We have relied primarily on tactical operations designed to deny AQ and their facilitators safe haven, and/or by killing/capturing known AQ leaders. By most measures our efforts to disrupt and destroy AQ using these tactics have had mixed results, and could arguably be seen as counterproductive to our intent. Until we understand and appreciate AQ's theory of war, and recognize that they are a sophisticated and formidable non-state enemy, we will continue to struggle in our efforts to marginalize their effectiveness. 
Estimates.
War is a matter of vital importance to the state…appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors…so you may assess its essentials…the first of these factors is moral influence…By Moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril. 4 In terms of moral influence, AQ's chief, Osama bin Laden continues to hold a commanding moral presence among jihadist followers throughout the world. Bin
Laden's personality and character traits are an exceptionally good fit with those of Islamic heroes of the past. 5 Bernard Lewis notes that because of bin Laden's stature as a near mythic Islamic hero, he remains an enormously popular figure, not only with extremists and radicals, but within much wider circles in the Arabic world. 6 
Anger his General and confuse him. If the enemy General is obstinate and prone to anger, insult him and enrage him, so he will be irritated and confused, and without a plan will recklessly advance against you. 10 Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance.
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Following the 9/11 attacks, the U. Estimates.
While AQ operations are generally well planned and calculated in advance, it is unlikely that they had the capability and intent to purposefully lay a trap that drew the U.S. into battle in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This said, they pushed, prodded and angered the U.S., to the point where an invasion of Iraq made sense to the Administration, and the American people, and was considered the best option to deny and disrupt AQ. The gravity of the 9/11 attacks, combined with the blunt and stubborn temperament of some senior Administration officials gave rise to an outcome that closely resembled Sun Tzu's theories on how one should exploit the enemies character and leadership style to goad them into battle.
When he is united, divide him. Sometimes drive a wedge between a sovereign and his ministers; on other occasions separate his allies from him. Make them mutually suspicious so they drift apart. Then you can plot against them. Rivers" denounced the diplomat, Ihab al-Sharif, as an "enemy of God" and declared that its holy warriors had killed him. It warned other Arab and Muslim countries that if they stationed diplomats in Baghdad, they would suffer the same fate. 18 The purpose of such brutal kidnapping operations is to sow fear and anger into the American people and its allies, and plant the seed that there would be retribution Sun Tzu said war is the most important concern of the state and must be thoroughly studied.
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Improving our current dilemma will require a fundamental change in how we view AQ and how future wars are fought. We need to acknowledge that AQ is essentially a global insurgency that is exploiting inequalities that many in the global Muslim community are experiencing on a daily basis. We need to focus our efforts on an effective "irregular warfare" strategy that provides vulnerable communities throughout the world with the benefits of indirect soft power. At present, no single U.S. agency or entity is responsible for coordinating and implementing an effective global irregular warfare and public diplomacy strategy.
As Samuel Griffith noted, implied in this comment is recognition that war is not a transitory aberration but a recurrent, conscious act that is susceptible to rational analysis. The U.S. and its allies have had difficulty conducting effective rational analysis on AQ, and have not fully appreciated many of the grievances raised by moderate Muslims. In order to develop an effective foreign policy approach that will succeed in achieving our goals, we need to have an adequate understanding of the enemy we face. If we continue to fight the long war by conducting kill/capture operations against AQ without a comprehensive global counterinsurgency strategy, to include coordinated, robust public diplomacy, we will face further defeat in the form of continued hate and discontent within the Islamic world, death to our citizens and allies, and the slow destruction our way of life.
One of the basic tenets of effective counterinsurgency is unity of command, force and effort. We need to explore the creation of a permanent department or agency within the federal government whose participants are diverse in their skills and abilities, well versed and committed to public diplomacy, development, humanitarian assistance, media influence operations, and when necessary targeted strikes throughout the world.
Without such a robust restructuring of our national instruments of power, the U.S. and our allies will continue to crawl and grope our way to certain failure.
A National Strategy to Eliminate the Threat
For the purposes of developing a successful national strategy to marginalize AQ as our most pressing threat, we need to visualize a plan of action through a lens other than the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. While these conflicts are critical to our national security posture, they have become so complex that they will require a separate plan of action and a separate analytical framework. It is fair to say that the lack of significant progress in Iraq and Afghanistan has helped the U.S. government overcome its institutional aversion to irregular warfare. The conflicts have also developed our understanding of the importance of stabilizing failed or failing states, and otherwise ungoverned spaces where AQ can plan and coordinate for future transnational insurgency operations. In an effort to remain intellectually consistent, the below recommendations will also be examined against the backdrop of Sun Tzu's teachings that were outlined in The Art of War.
An Eastern Strategy Against the Asymmetric Threat
Since 9/11 and the subsequent interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S.
has returned to a belief in irregular warfare as a viable way forward against state and nonstate, asymmetric enemies such as AQ. While irregular warfare has a direct tactical component that is aggressive and violent, the goal is to "win the hearts and minds" of the enemy, with as little direct confrontation as possible, thus achieving more with less force. 30 It is different from the often blunt, Western way of warfare which is characterized by heavy firepower and heavy defensive armaments, the inability to retreat, and the goal of absolute destruction of the enemy's forces in the field of battle. 31 
Institutionalizing the Doctrine of Irregular Warfare
Estimates.
War is a matter of vital importance to the state…appraise it in terms of the five fundamental factors…so you may assess its essentials…the fifth of these factors is doctrine…By doctrine I mean organization….control. Operations," and declared that stability operations were a core U.S. military mission to be accorded priority comparable with that of combat operations. Shortly thereafter, U.S.
Army occupational specialties were shifted to this new core mission by the tens of thousands. 33 The 2006 While it appears that the post 9/11 DOD has embraced a doctrinal approach to irregular warfare, this does not mean it will be accepted as a long term military doctrine.
History has been here before, and this is the third major attempt by the U. expanded counterinsurgency operations and assigned a cabinet-level body, "the Special Group," to be responsible for coordinating irregular operations. Despite these organizational changes that promoted the stature of irregular warfare, the changes were given little consideration in a military establishment that was dominated by a view that
Vietnam was essentially a conventional war.
The Small Wars Manual was insightful, and was the precursor for many of the methods and tactics that were used in forming contemporary irregular warfare doctrine. The events of 9/11, and the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, demonstrated that instability throughout the world can be a potent threat to the American people and our national interests. In this context winning battles becomes less significant than stabilizing populations and establishing effective governance. 40 In 2006 the U.S.
Army/Marine Corps issued FM 3-24, known as the Counterinsurgency Handbook. 41 During the past 100 years the U.S. military has resisted adopting irregular warfare as a long-term doctrinal approach and our historical efforts to transform our organizational irregular warfighting capabilities has been characterized as a litany of failure.
The handbook was an innovative restatement of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine, and incorporated several years of lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. 42 While it appears that the U.S. has adopted irregular warfare to counter the present transnational terrorist threats, there is already a movement inside and outside the Pentagon regarding the lack of preparedness for high-end, traditional military conflict. 43 As Sun Tzu noted, doctrine, organization, and control are vital elements of successful warfighting, and generals who did not master these virtues would be defeated.
Combined with the frustrations associated with irregular warfare in Iraq and
Afghanistan, there may be a gradual push back to the conventional warfare status quo.
In 
Energy.
…In battle there are only normal forces and the extraordinary forces, but their combinations are limitless; none can comprehend them all…For these two forces are mutually reproductive; their interaction as endless as that of interlocked rings. Who can determine where one begins and the other ends… 45 Implicit in Sun Tzu's guidance is a call for joining all elements of national power to create a strong unified front against our adversaries. It has long been held that effective irregular warfare requires unity of effort 46 , and best practices since the early 1960s, have demonstrated that close collaboration between the U.S. military and the entire U.S. civilian community can produce optimal results. 47 Despite the renewed interest in irregular warfare as an effective tool to combat the global insurgency, and the acknowledgement that the civilian-military interagency approach is necessary in effectively carrying out irregular warfare, the U.S. government has achieved little traction in institutionalizing a permanent interagency approach to conduct such warfare.
While recognized as necessary, the whole of the government's approach can currently be described as temporary, disjointed, and ad hoc. This inability to fully integrate and leverage civilian-military interagency cooperation fails to strategically exploit all the elements of our national power against our enemies, who thrive in the realm of irregular conflict.
Because irregular warfare is tied to issues affected by economic, political, rather than the structure of "unity of command," which is a fundamental principle of warfare. 48 In order to realize the guidance of Sun Tzu, creating a joint force whose "interactions are as endless as that of interlocked rings" we need a fully integrated civilian-military command structure that focuses on irregular warfare as a strategic and tactical solution to the transnational insurgent threat that is posed by AQ.
Following the tragedy of 9/11 the inability of the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities to work together as a unified front was identified as a key reason why government failed to prevent the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 commission noted that synchronizing all of the instruments of national power against the global insurgency was of extreme importance, but would be difficult to achieve with the myriad of agencies who had independent interests, and routinely "stove-piped" critical information. 49 The 9/11 commission further noted that because coping with terrorism was not the sole province of any component of the U.S. government, a coordinating mechanism was necessary. Century has direct implications to transnational terrorist organizations such as AQ, which exploit failed states to plan and coordinate operations that threaten our national fabric, and the global commons. As such, the possible outcome of not dramatically restructuring our national security apparatus responsible for irregular warfare is critical. 52 Lew Irwin noted that the U.S. government has consistently failed to apply the full weight of its instruments of power during irregular warfare largely because the military and the various agencies cannot agree upon the ends, ways and means to prosecute those wars. While Irwin recognized the need for an interagency mechanism to coordinate irregular warfare, he dismissed the creation of another government bureaucracy, or the restructuring the National Security Council to exercise centralized planning and oversight over irregular warfare as ineffective. 53 Irwin instead calls for the integration of interagency personal, involved in carrying out complex operations, throughout the current military combatant command structure.
One of the most salient observations noted by Irwin was to provide the irregular warfare units in the field clear strategic-level statements of intent, resources, and the responsibility and the authority to make decisions without centralized approval. 54 A second model, proposed by Hans Binnendijk and Patrick Cronin, recognized the need for centralized interagency coordination in terms of irregular warfare, but recommended a strong, empowered, cross functional interagency team that reports to the National Security Council.
While there needs to be a centralized command structure to synchronize operations and to articulate the overall diplomatic narrative, it is up to the civilian-military units in the field to determine how that narrative can be best implemented into operations at the local level. This decentralized authority is necessary to ensure that irregular warfare stays irregular. It also ensures that direct and indirect irregular warfare operations are carried out in the most expeditious manner based on dynamic conditions on the ground. 55 A third option is an approach similar to the "NCTC Regardless of the civilian-military entity created, there is overwhelming agreement that such permanent integration is sorely needed, and will likely come about only with a strong legislative mandate. If the U.S. government continues to view complex operations as an insignificant, passing problem, deserving only of a temporary, ad hoc coordination approach, we will never achieve Sun Tzu's concept of limitless strength of forces.
Conclusion
The teachings of Sun Tzu are as relevant today as they were in 500 B.C. During the past 9 years the U.S. and our allies have only begun to understand and appreciate the capabilities and the weaknesses of the global Islamic insurgency, seeing the world as our enemy sees it. The renewed interest in irregular warfare as a means to counter global jihadist operations, however, is still untested as it was developed and implemented in a piecemeal fashion in Afghanistan and Iraq. The test of our resolve and our acceptance of irregular warfare doctrine will take place in failed or failing states where AQ has been striving to exert their influence, such as Yemen, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. It is in these locations that we can plan and execute a well developed, fully synchronized indirect approach that incorporates all the instruments of national power under the joint civilian-military authority. While the conflicts in these failing states are of critical strategic importance to our national security efforts, they will also serve as "test beds" to evaluate our irregular warfare doctrine and the civilian-military organizational structure that implements such tactics.
Despite this nascent doctrinal shift toward irregular warfare, there is already a quiet undercurrent of organizational resistance within the U.S. military and among the relevant U.S. departments/agencies that make up the broader interagency community.
It is imperative that we resist this historical inclination to grow tired of the protracted nature of indirect warfare, and that we continue to refine and develop our irregular warfare doctrine, tactical and strategic capabilities, and establish an interagency operational center that will strategically plan and synchronize these complex operations.
Once and for all, the U.S. must embrace and implement irregular methods of warfare against an irregular enemy, adhering to the guidance that Sun Tzu insightfully laid out over 2500 years ago. 
